This paper revisits the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. We drop the distinction between forced and voluntary turnovers and introduce the concept of performanceinduced turnover, defined as turnover that would not have occurred had performance been "good". We document a close link between firm performance and CEO turnover and estimate that almost 50% of turnovers in the first eight tenure years are performance induced. This is significantly higher than the number of forced turnovers identified in prior studies. We contrast the empirical properties of performance-induced turnovers with the predictions of Bayesian learning models of CEO turnover. Learning by boards about CEO ability appears to be slow, and boards act as if CEO ability were subject to frequent and sizeable shocks.
Replacing badly performing CEOs is one of the key responsibilities of corporate boards, and the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance has been studied extensively.
The prior literature has found only modest effects of firm performance on CEO turnover.
Depending on the sample and the performance measure used, the estimated probability of a forced CEO turnover is between 2 and 6 percentage points higher per year for a bottom decile performer than for a top decile performer. 1 Consequently, Jensen and Murphy (1990) and others conclude that dismissals are not an important source of CEO incentives. Several papers have proposed that the relative paucity of forced CEO turnovers after bad performance is due to CEO entrenchment and weak corporate governance (Weisbach (1988) , Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , Taylor (2010) ).
This paper does away with the distinction between forced and voluntary turnovers and instead introduces the concept of performance-induced turnover, defined as turnover that would not have occurred had performance been "good". The probability of performanceinduced turnover at performance level t x is identified from the difference between the turnover probability at t x and the turnover probability at a high performance threshold � , such as the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution. The assumption is that turnovers at and above this performance level are unrelated to performance and, thus, occur at any level of performance. Any higher turnover probability at performance levels below the threshold is assumed to be caused by performance being worse. These additional turnovers are labelled as performance-induced.
We find that a large fraction of CEO turnovers are performance induced, and that the frequency of performance-induced turnovers is about twice as high as the number of forced turnovers identified in prior studies. Based on our estimates, almost 40% of all CEO turnovers are performance induced. In the first eight years of tenure, this percentage is close to 50%.
The probability of performance-induced turnover increases slightly with tenure at first and peaks in tenure years 7 to 8. In contrast, forced turnovers, classified using the literature's most popular classification algorithm, peak in tenure year 2 already. The likely reason for this discrepancy is that most departures of long-tenured CEOs are pre-announced retirements, which are classified as voluntary turnovers. However, our analysis reveals that a substantial fraction of these departures are in fact performance induced, which means that many more of them occur at low than at high levels of performance.
We contrast the empirical properties of performance-induced turnovers with the predictions of Bayesian learning models of CEO turnover, which are the most frequently used theoretical framework of the prior literature. 2 The evidence is inconsistent with the literature's workhorse model in which boards learn from firm performance about constant CEO ability.
This model predicts that boards assign the same weight to all lags of the performance signal.
Empirically, performance-induced turnover is driven by performance in the most recent three to four years but is insensitive to performance further in the past. Moreover, the weights assigned to past performance barely decline with tenure for the first ten tenure years. The degree to which these weights decline indicates the extent to which boards' beliefs about CEO ability are becoming more precise. The fact that these weights are not declining with tenure suggests that boards' beliefs are not converging.
The evidence is consistent with a version of the Bayesian learning model in which CEO ability or, more likely, match quality, is changing over time. With changing CEO ability, boards optimally assign larger weights to more recent performance signals than to older ones.
Intuitively, shocks to CEO ability increase the relative importance of newer performance signals, which are most informative about current CEO ability. With changing CEO ability, the variances of boards' beliefs about CEOs also decline more slowly, if at all, and the beliefs remain sensitive to new performance signals even late in tenure.
The shocks to CEO ability necessary to reconcile the Bayesian learning model with the data are fairly large. Even though CEO turnovers are highly sensitive to current performance and performance in the previous year, they are essentially unrelated to performance four and more years ago. This suggests that CEO ability (or match quality) changes sufficiently fast that performance from four years ago is uninformative about CEO ability today. In the same vein, to keep the variance of boards' beliefs (and the sensitivity of these beliefs to new performance signals) constant, the shocks to CEO ability have to undo any learning effects from the performance signals. The sensitivity of turnover to current performance shows that current performance is informative about CEO ability, which in turn implies that the shocks to ability have to be large enough to reverse the associated gains in belief precision.
Finally, the observation that performance-induced turnover probabilities increase slowly with tenure and peak in tenure years 7 to 8 is further evidence that learning about CEO ability is slow. It is, however, also consistent with high costs of turnover, or with incumbent CEOs having higher expected ability than potential replacements. Both imply that small negative signals early in tenure do not trigger turnovers, which instead increase with tenure as negative signals accumulate. In this context, it is interesting to note that the turnover rate for rank-andfile employees tends to peak after only 3-6 months of tenure, and thus much earlier than for CEOs (Farber (1994) ). This suggests that the ability of rank-and-file employees is revealed more quickly, or that turnover costs are smaller, or that the ability difference between incumbents and replacements is smaller.
Most prior studies on the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover have focused on so-called "forced" CEO turnover. The literature has devised a number of algorithms to distinguish between forced and voluntary departures based on CEO age, press reports, and other information. 3 Inevitably, any algorithm misclassifies some turnovers, and any misclassifications affect the estimated frequency of forced turnover and its estimated relation to firm performance. Moreover, CEO departures can be forced without being due to bad performance, and departures can be due to bad performance without being forced. For example, bad performance might cause CEOs to voluntarily retire early, while outstanding performance might cause boards to convince CEOs to stay beyond scheduled retirement dates.
In contrast, our approach makes no a-priori determination whether a particular departure is forced or voluntary, and instead considers all departures as potentially performance-induced.
Intuitively, we treat the turnover frequency of very high-performing CEOs as benchmark and identify performance-induced turnovers from the additional turnovers observed for worseperforming CEOs. Thus, the focus is on the extent to which bad performance causes additional turnover, independently of who initiates the departure, the board or the CEO. This perspective is useful, not only because it avoids biases due to misclassifications, but also because future firm performance is determined by whether bad CEO-firm matches are dissolved, independently of whether the CEO is forced out by the board or not. 4 Section 1 of this paper reviews Bayesian learning models of CEO turnover and derives testable implications. Section 2 describes the estimation of performance-induced turnover.
Section 3 describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section 4 presents and interprets the empirical results. Section 5 provides further discussion of the results, and Section 6 concludes.
1 Theoretical framework
A simple Bayesian learning model of CEO turnover
This section describes a simple Bayesian learning model of CEO turnover. Its ingredients are similar to the more complex models in Jovanovic (1979) , Harris and Holmström (1982) , Murphy (1986) , Gibbons and Murphy (1992) , Weisbach (1998), and Taylor (2010) . A corporate board hires a new CEO of unobservable and uncertain ability. The board updates its beliefs about the CEO after observing signals of ability, such as firm performance.
These updates can cause the board to fire the CEO.
We denote the board's initial prior about the CEO's ability as α0 and assume that it is normally distributed with mean � 0 and variance 1 0 . For simplicity, set � 0 = 0. Every period, the board learns from firm performance about CEO ability. Firm performance xt equals the CEO's true ability α plus a normally distributed i.i.d. noise term with mean zero and variance 1 :
The board updates its believes about ability every period according to Bayes' rule. The mean of the board's posterior estimate of CEO ability is a weighted average of the board's initial prior (normalized to zero) and all signals received since the CEO's hiring. Specifically, after observing performance in period t, the posterior mean is:
is the variance of the board's posterior estimate in t-1. The board fires the CEO when the posterior mean in year t falls below an endogenous threshold . 5 This simple framework has two testable implications:
1. The board puts equal weight on each of the performance signals when forming its estimate of CEO ability.
This prediction follows directly from the assumptions that the CEO's ability, and the relationship between ability and the signal, are constant over time.
2. The sensitivity of the board's estimate of CEO ability to any of the performance signals declines with tenure.
In tenure year t, the weight on prior signal xi equals + , which diminishes with t. Intuitively, the marginal value of each signal decreases as the number of signals goes up and the board's beliefs about CEO ability become more precise. Empirically, the speed with which the weights on the performance signals decline with tenure indicates the speed with which the board is determining CEO ability.
Extension: changing CEO quality
The prior literature assumes that CEO ability is constant. 6 However, CEO ability or, more likely, the quality of the CEO-firm match, might change over time due to changes in the firm, its environment, or the CEO himself. In this section, we modify the simple learning model by assuming that the CEO's true ability follows a random walk:
The i.i.d. shocks are normally distributed with a mean of zero and variance 1 . The random shock occurs in the beginning of each period t, before the board observes the signal xt. The 5 The threshold is determined by the board trading off the costs of firing the CEO against the expected benefit of replacing him. See Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Taylor (2010) for examples. 6 See, for example, Harris and Holmström (1982) , Murphy (1986) , Gibbons and Murphy (1992) , Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , and Taylor (2010 and Taylor ( , 2013 . Kim (1996) is a notable exception.
board then forms its posterior belief � and fires the CEO if the posterior mean falls below the threshold . The model with changing CEO ability has two testable implications: 7 1. When forming beliefs about CEO ability, boards assign larger weight to more recent performance signals than to older ones.
Intuitively, random shocks to CEO ability increase the importance of current performance signals, which are informative about the most recent shocks, relative to older signals. The rate at which the weights on past performance decline depends on the size of the shocks to CEO ability. The ratio of the optimal weight on a signal from last period relative to the weight on a signal from the current period is
is the variance of the board's posterior beliefs last period and 1 is the variance of the shock to ability. Thus, if the shock to ability doubles the variance of the board's beliefs, the signal from the current period receives twice the weight of the signal from the last period.
2. The larger the shocks to ability, the more sensitive the board's beliefs remain to current performance as tenure increases.
Without shocks to ability, as tenure increases, the board's beliefs about the CEO become more precise, and the sensitivity of these beliefs to new performance signals declines. With shocks to ability, the variance of the board's beliefs declines more slowly, if at all, and the beliefs remain more sensitive to new performance signals. Empirically, the degree to which the sensitivity of beliefs to performance declines with tenure indicates the degree to which these beliefs are becoming more precise. If the sensitivity does not decline with tenure, then boards' beliefs are not converging.
Estimating Bayesian learning models of CEO turnover
To estimate Bayesian learning models of CEO turnover, one needs to add a mean-zero noise term to the (so far) deterministic relationship between prior performance and the board's estimate of CEO ability. Consider, for example, a sample of CEOs in tenure year t=2 with information on performance in years t=1 and t=2 and a variable fire equal to one for CEOs dismissed in year 2: 7 The derivation of all results is in Appendix A.
If the noise term 2 is normally distributed, this model can be estimated with a probit regression of CEO turnover in year 2 on firm performance in years t=1 and t=2. The latent variable in the probit model is the board's posterior estimate of CEO ability, � 2 , and the probit coefficients correctly estimate the weights the board assigns to prior performance when assessing CEO ability:
Estimating (6) The approach taken in this paper is to do away with any a-priori distinction between forced and voluntary turnover. Instead, we simply ask whether bad firm performance leads to CEOfirm separations. What matters for future firm performance is whether bad CEO-firm matches are dissolved; whether this dissolution involves a CEO firing, a voluntary retirement, or anything between these two extremes is of secondary importance. 10 To operationalize this idea, we introduce the concept of performance-induced turnover, defined as turnover that would not have occurred had performance been "good". Conceptually, we model the CEO turnover probability as the sum of two independent turnover processes, one of which is unrelated to performance and one of which is negatively related to firm performance.
We are interested in estimating the intensity of the process for performance-induced turnover. Reordering equation (7) 
In order to estimate (8), we need an estimate of other P , the probability of turnover that is unrelated to performance. To obtain this estimate, we assume that the probability of performance-induced turnover is zero at and above some high performance threshold � , such as the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution. All turnovers at and above � are assumed 9 Firms might also force well-performing CEOs into retirement because the firms are committed to a promotion tournament between internal succession candidates (Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Main, O'Reilly, and Wade (1993) ). 10 This idea is explicit in competitive assignment models of workers or executives to firms (Jovanovic (1979) , Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013)): a CEO-firm match dissolves when the match surplus falls below the firm's and the CEO's outside options, and for many separations the distinction between quits and firings is not meaningful.
to be unrelated to performance and, thus, to occur at any level of performance. 11 Hence, the turnover frequency at and above � forms the empirical estimate of other P .
Any higher turnover probability observed at performance levels below the threshold � is assumed to be caused by performance being worse. These additional turnovers yield the empirical estimate of perf ind P − . Concretely, the probability of performance-induced turnover at performance level < � is calculated from the difference between the turnover probability at and the turnover probability at the performance threshold � :
The numerator is set to zero when this difference is negative (this occurs mostly at performance levels above the threshold). The denominator is an adjustment for CEOs that experience both performance-induced turnover and other, not performance-related turnover in the same year. 12
The only ingredient in the computation of − � , � � is an estimate of the turnoverperformance relation ( ). It is therefore important to choose the right functional form for the estimation of ( ). A standard probit model with linear performance terms, such as that in eq. (6), is not appropriate if the set of turnovers includes events unrelated to performance, such as planned retirements or departures due to ill health. With a probit model (and a negative effect of performance on turnover), the turnover probability must go to zero at very high levels of performance. If there are turnovers that occur independently of performance, a probit model cannot fit the data.
We use two approaches to model the empirical relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. The first approach is a simple modification of the standard probit model.
The second approach explicitly allows for two turnover processes. 11 A violation of this assumption would lead us to underestimate the frequency of performance-induced turnover. See Section 2.4 for further discussion. 12 For example, a CEO aged 65 might have retired independently of performance but, if performance was also bad, would have been fired had he not retired.
A probit model with performance deciles
To allow the turnover probability to converge to a non-zero level at high levels of performance, we model ( ) as a probit with performance-decile indicators:
2 to 10 are indicators for performance deciles and is a vector of controls. This specification allows the estimation to match the empirical turnover probability in each performance decile. The probability of turnover unrelated to performance, ℎ = ( � ),
is calculated as the implied turnover probability with performance in the top decile. Given this estimate, the probability of performance-induced turnover is calculated from equation (9).
This approach is straightforward and close to the models used in the prior literature, but it has two disadvantages: First, the need to create decile indicators restricts the model to a single performance measure. If boards assign unequal weights to performance at different lags, then this model is unable to accommodate it. Second, the coefficients estimated from eq. (10) do not correspond to the coefficients in the learning models in Section 1 and, hence, cannot be used to test predictions from these models.
A two-probit model
The second approach to modeling the turnover probability explicitly allows for two independent turnover processes, one that is affected by performance and one that is not. We use probit specifications for both processes:
is a vector of performance measures and 1 and 2 are vectors of controls. Because there are two turnover processes, one of which is not a function of performance, the total turnover frequency can decline with without converging to zero at high performance levels.
The two-probit model has the added advantage that it can accommodate multiple performance measures, including multiple lags of performance. Moreover, the coefficients on correspond to the coefficients in the Bayesian learnings models in Section 1, and hence, can be used to test predictions from these models.
A numerical example
We illustrate the estimation using a simple numerical example with two types of departures: performance-driven departures (dismissals) and departures unrelated to performance (retirements). In any year, the CEO can choose to retire, the board can decide to dismiss the CEO, or both events can occur simultaneously. The econometrician cannot distinguish dismissals from retirements but can observe whether a turnover has occurred:
We assume that the noise terms in both turnover processes follow a standard normal distribution. Dismissals occur with probability = ( 1 + 2 • � ) and retirements occur with constant probability = ( 1 ). The parameters 1 , 1 , and 2 are set to -1.4, -1.6, and -0.4 to approximate the empirical turnover probabilities from Section 4. The performance measure � is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 0.1 and a standard deviation of 0.3 (to match the empirical section, performance is scaled by its standard deviation). Figure 1 shows the probabilities of turnovers, dismissals, and retirements by performance decile in a large simulated sample (n = 1,000,000). The figure also shows estimates of performance-induced turnover obtained using the two methods described in the previous sections. Both procedures first estimate the probability of total turnover ( ) using either eq. (10) for the probit model with decile dummies or eq. (11) for the two-probit model. The performance-induced turnover probability − ( , � ) is then computed using eq. (9) with the threshold � set to the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution. The estimated probabilities are averaged within each performance decile and the averages plotted in Fig. 1 . Fig.1 : Estimating performance-induced turnover: numerical example. The simulated sample has 1,000,000 CEO-years. Dismissals occur with probability P dismiss = Φ(β 1 + β 2 • x � t ) and retirements occur with probability P retire = Φ(α 1 ). Parameters α 1 , β 1 , and β 2 are set to -1.4, -1.6, and -0.4, respectively; � is normally distributed with a mean of 0.1 and a standard deviation of 0.3. Total turnover is governed by eq. (12). The turnover-performance relation P turn (x t ) is estimated using either a standard probit model with decile dummies (eq. (10)) or the two-probit model (eq. (11)). The performance term is scaled by its standard deviation. Performance-induced turnover, defined in eq. (9), is calculated for each observation with X � equal to the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution. All probabilities depicted in the figure are averages across observations within each performance decile.
Both methods -the simple probit with dummies and the two-probit model -produce nearly identical estimates of performance-induced turnover. The figure also shows that the performance-induced turnover probabilities are slightly below the true dismissal probabilities. This is because the performance-induced turnover calculation assumes that all turnovers at and above � are not caused by bad performance. In this sample, however, the dismissal probability at the 95 th percentile threshold is still 0.9%.
To assess the behavior of the estimation methods in samples sized like the empirical data, we repeat the estimations in 500 simulated samples of 23,000 observations each. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the simulated dismissal probabilities and the estimated performanceinduced turnover probabilities. As before, the performance-induced turnover probabilities tend to be slightly below the dismissal probabilities. The bottom panel of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the estimated coefficients on firm performance in the two-probit models. Both the mean and median estimates are close to the true coefficient of 2 = -0.40. Hence, the two- 
Discussion
The concept of performance-induced turnover and its empirical measure
offer a new way to analyze the relation between firm performance and CEO departures.
Importantly, performance-induced turnover differs from forced turnover in that it includes any type of departure caused by bad performance, independently of whether the decision is made by the board or the CEO himself. This includes firings by the board, but also cases in which bad performance causes CEOs to give up voluntarily or to retire early. In the same spirit, forced turnovers that are unrelated to performance, for example those caused by personal scandals or violations of rules, do not qualify as performance induced.
A major advantage of this approach is that estimating − ( , � ) does not require that the researcher distinguish forced from voluntary turnovers or determine a priori which turnovers are due to bad performance. More fundamentally, performance-induced turnover is, arguably, more relevant for the allocation of managerial talent to firms than forced turnover.
What matters for firm performance is whether bad CEO-firm matches are dissolved; whether this dissolution involves a CEO firing, a voluntary retirement, or anything between these two extremes is of secondary importance.
There are two caveats. First, the estimation of performance-induced turnover requires choosing a performance threshold above which all turnovers are assumed to be independent of performance. To the extent that this assumption is violated, − ( , � ) underestimates how many turnovers are caused by bad performance. This occurs if there are turnovers caused by bad performance even above the performance threshold (i.e., turnovers that would not have happened had performance been even better). This also occurs if there are turnovers above the threshold that are caused by good performance (i.e., that would not have happened had performance been lower). An example are successful CEOs who are hired away by other firms.
Both violations cause our approach to overestimate the number of turnovers that are unrelated to performance, and hence to underestimate the number of turnovers that are due to bad performance. In robustness tests, we find that the results are robust to using a range of thresholds. The turnover-performance relation flattens out at high levels of performance, which supports the assumption that most turnovers in this region are unrelated to performance, and which also makes the exact choice of � less important.
Second, for reasons already discussed, performance-induced turnover does not equal the CEO dismissals in the Bayesian learning models discussed in Section 1. For example, CEOs who give up because of bad performance play no role in these models but are included in performance-induced turnover. It is important to keep this distinction in mind when interpreting any differences between the predictions of the models and the empirical properties of performance-induced turnover. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the sample.
Sample and data
All CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2010 are classified as either voluntary or forced using the Parrino (1997) algorithm. Section 4.3 and Appendix B describe details of the classification procedure. The required turnover announcements, press reports, and CEO ages are obtained by searching the Factiva database. For the years 2002 to 2010, we combine our own data collection with data from Peters and Wagner (2009) . This procedure yields 879 forced and 2,395 voluntary turnovers in 27,708 CEO-years. Merging with control variables reduces the sample to 735 forced and 2,010 voluntary turnovers in 22,465 CEO-years.
Financial statement data is from the Compustat database and stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The measure of firm performance used in the CEO turnover regressions are average monthly stock returns scaled by their standard deviation.
The standard deviation is measured over 48 months, ending with and including the period over which stock returns are averaged. The reason for normalizing stock returns by their standard deviation is to make the returns of more and less volatile firms comparable.
Empirical analysis
This section presents the empirical estimates of performance-induced turnover. The analysis uses the two estimation approaches described earlier: the standard probit with performance decile indicators and the two-probit model. 
Performance-induced turnover in the full sample
This section estimates performance-induced turnover using the full sample from 1993 to 2011. Results from the standard probit with decile indicators are in Table 3 . The dependent variable is set to one for tenure years with CEO turnover and to zero otherwise. The key independent variables are decile indicators for the firm's past stock price performance.
Performance is measured as average monthly stock returns scaled by their standard deviation.
Because it is not a priori known how many years of performance boards take into account when assessing CEOs, the regressions use four different performance windows. In the first three regressions, returns are measured from tenure year -1, -2, or -3 through year zero (the turnover year), respectively. The fourth regression measures performance over the CEO's entire tenure up to (and including) year zero.
The implied turnover probabilities are reported in Panel B. Using eq. (9) observation by observation, the probability of performance-induced turnover is computed from the difference between the model-implied turnover probability and how much smaller this probability would have been had performance been in the top decile. Hence, the performance-induced turnover probability is the additional turnover probability the model attributes to performance being worse than in the top decile.
The results show that CEO turnover is strongly linked to performance and that a substantial fraction of turnovers are performance-induced. Depending on the performance window, the average implied turnover probability if performance is in the top decile is between 7.7 and 8.1% per tenure year. This probability rises to between 17.6 and 18.9% in the bottom decile.
The average performance-induced turnover probability varies between 4.1 and 4.5% per tenure
year. With a total turnover probability of 11.77% per tenure year, these estimates imply that between 35 and 38% of all turnovers are performance induced. Looking across columns, lengthening the performance window first slightly increases and then decreases the estimated probability of performance-induced turnover. We examine the effects of performance at different lags more carefully using the two-probit model next. Table 4 shows results from the two-probit model. Panel A presents coefficient estimates for both turnover equations -one including firm performance and one without. Panel B presents the implied turnover probabilities. The probabilities of performance-induced turnover are again computed using eq. (9). The calculation uses the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution as the threshold above which all turnovers are assumed to be unrelated to performance. 13
The first two regressions use scaled stock returns from years -2 and -3 through year zero (the turnover year) as performance measure. The estimates of performance-induced turnover of almost 4.5% per tenure year are similar to the corresponding estimates using the standard probit (with decile indicators) in Table 3 . As in the simulations in Section 2.3, both estimation approaches yield almost identical estimates of performance-induced turnover.
An advantage of the two-probit model is that it accommodates multiple performance terms and can thus assign different coefficients to performance at different lags. The third regression in Table 4 includes three separate performance terms for scaled stock returns in tenure years -2, -1, and zero. The fourth regression adds scaled stock returns in tenure year -3.
The results in Table 4 strongly reject the Bayesian learning model with constant CEO ability (described in Section 1.1), which predicts that boards assign the same weight to all lags of the performance signal. Instead, more recent performance receives significantly larger weight than performance in previous years. For example, in column 4, the coefficient on performance in tenure year -1 is -0.22, compared to -0.15 and -0.08 for years -2 and -3. Wald tests indicate that these differences are statistically significant, with chi-squared statistics of 6.48 (p=0.01), 17.41 (p=0.00), and 4.95 (p=0.03) for years -1 and -2, -1 and -3, and -2 and -3, respectively. 14 In an untabulated regression, we include an additional performance term for tenure year -4, which receives an insignificant coefficient of -0.03.
One potential explanation for boards assigning higher weight to more recent performance is that CEO ability, or the quality of the CEO-firm match, changes over time (see Section 1.2).
The rapid decline of the coefficients on lagged performance in Table 4 suggests that the necessary shocks to CEO ability are large. For example, performance three years ago receives only about one-third of the weight of current performance, and performance from four or more years ago is mostly ignored. In the context of the Bayesian learning model in Section 1.2, this only makes sense if CEO ability (or match quality) changes so rapidly that performance from four years ago is almost completely uninformative about CEO ability today.
The results in Table 4 also imply that turnover regressions that use only one performance term are misspecified. These regressions implicitly impose the same weight on all performance signals within the performance window, while the evidence shows that boards put more weight on more recent performance. Hence, the two-probit model, which accommodates multiple performance terms with different weights, has an advantage over the probit model with decile indicators. 15 Based on the two-probit models in columns 3 and 4, between 38 and 39% of all CEO turnovers are performance induced. Tables 3 and 4 show that performance has a stronger effect on CEO turnover than suggested by the prior literature. Most prior studies focus on forced CEO turnovers, which are identified using press releases, news reports, announcement dates, and CEO age. Typical studies classify between 13 and 20% of turnovers as forced. 16 Our estimates suggest that there are twice as many performance-induced turnovers as turnovers the literature classifies as forced. This is the more surprising given that forced turnovers include CEO dismissals that are unrelated to firm performance, such as firings for personal scandals or violations of rules. Hence, our estimates suggest a much tighter link between firm performance and CEO turnover than previously discovered. 0 performance. Hence, the similarity of the coefficients on year 0 and year -1 performance suggests that boards assign higher weight to year 0 performance before a turnover than to performance in year -1. 15 The implied turnover probabilities in Panel B are consistent with this observation. The difference in turnover probabilities between good and bad performers, and thus the probability of performance-induced turnover, is slightly higher in columns 3 and 4 (with multiple performance terms) than in columns 1 and 2 (with a single performance term). 16 Using different algorithms, the percentage of CEO turnovers classified as forced is 20% in Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) , 18% in Dennis and Dennis (1995), 13% in Parrino (1997) , 13% in Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) , 16% in Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004 ), 13% in Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2003 ), 19% in Brookman and Thistle (2009 , and 17% in Taylor (2010) .
The estimates in

CEO turnover across tenure
This section explores how the turnover-performance relationship changes with tenure. The Bayesian learning models from Section 1.1, and especially the model with constant CEO ability, predict that the weights boards assign to lagged performance decline with CEO tenure.
As boards' beliefs about their CEOs become more precise, each performance signal should affect these beliefs less. To test this prediction, we split the sample into three tenure periods: tenure years 3-6, 7-10, and 11-18. Choosing these relatively long periods allows us to estimate the coefficients on performance with higher precision. Table 5 shows results from estimating the two-probit model separately in each subsample. Each regression includes all performance lags that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
There are three important results. First, for CEOs of all tenure levels, turnover is a function of recent performance, but not of performance in the more distant past. For example, even in tenure years 11-18, only returns in the current and the previous three years are statistically significant. When the fourth lag is included, the coefficient on performance in year -4 is -0.01, with a t-statistic of -0.2 (untabulated). These results again contradict the learning model with constant CEO ability, according to which all performance lags should affect CEO turnover equally. Instead, boards act as if performance from four and more years ago contains almost no information about CEO ability (or match quality) today.
Second, the coefficients on firm performance show little to no decline with CEO tenure.
The learning models predict that the coefficients on past performance should decline with tenure as boards' beliefs about CEO ability become more precise. The results in Table 5 provide little support for this prediction. The coefficient on year-zero performance is almost exactly the same in years 11-18 as in years 3-6 (with estimates of -0.210 and -0.207, respectively). The coefficient on performance in year -1 shows a small decline from -0.275 in years 3-6 to -0.238 in years 7-10 and declines substantially only in years 11-18. None of the declines are statistically significant. The coefficients on performance in years -2 and -3 actually increase with tenure. Thus, there is little evidence that boards respond less strongly to new performance signals in late tenure than in early tenure, or that their views of CEO ability are converging over time. This evidence is consistent with a model in which boards' learning is hampered by shocks to CEO ability. Table 5 . The model allows for different intercepts and different coefficients on performance in each of seven tenure groups: tenure year(s) 2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-11, 12-16, and 17 and higher. The number of included current and lagged annual performance terms is two for tenure year 2, three for tenure years 3-4 and 5-6, and four for all other tenure years.
Third, the frequency of performance-induced turnover first slightly increases with tenure and starts to decline relatively late. In Table 5 , the performance-induced turnover probability is 5.22% per year in tenure years 3-6, 5.25% in 7-10, and 4.25% in 11-18. To examine the tenure-turnover relation in finer detail, Fig. 2 shows the implied turnover probabilities from a two-probit model with the tenure years partitioned into seven groups (years 2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-11, 12-16, and 17 and higher). The model allows the intercepts and the coefficients on performance to vary across the seven periods. The results confirm that the probability of performance-induced turnover first rises with tenure, starting from 4.7% in tenure year 2, peaks at 5.5% in tenure years 7-8, and then declines slowly to 3.8% in tenure years 17 and higher.
Notably, according to these estimates, almost exactly 50% of turnovers in the first eight tenure years are performance induced.
Bayesian learning models of CEO turnover can produce turnover probabilities that first rise and then decline with tenure. The slow increase in turnover frequencies in early tenure and the late peak in tenure years 7-8 suggest that boards do not determine CEO quality quickly, or 
Forced CEO turnover
This section compares performance-induced turnover to forced CEO turnovers, which are the focus of the prior literature. Because firms are not required to reveal the true reasons for a turnover, prior studies use a variety of algorithms to sort turnovers into those that are forced and those that are voluntary. The most widely used algorithm was introduced by Parrino (1997) and uses press reports, the time between the turnover announcement and the actual turnover, The first regression in Table 6 uses the entire CEO panel. The results show that forced turnovers are strongly linked to prior performance. The probability of a forced turnover rises from 0.4% at the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution to 7.2% at the 5 th percentile.
The overall probability of a forced turnover of 2.7% per year is, however, considerably lower than our estimate of the probability of performance-induced turnover (4.7% per year in Table   4 ). Similar to performance-induced turnovers, forced turnovers are a function of relatively 17 The Parrino algorithm has been used in, among others, Parrino (1997 ), Farrell and Whidbee (2000 , 2003 , Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) , Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) , Yermack (2006) , Lel and Miller (2008) , Brookman and Thistle (2009), Peters and Wagner (2009), Bushman, Dai, and Wang (2010) , Taylor (2010) , Kaplan and Minton (2012) , and Jenter and Kanaan (2014) . 18 Because there are few forced turnovers at very high levels of firm performance, following the literature and using a standard probit regression for forced (as opposed to all) turnover is appropriate. recent performance only. In the full panel, four lags of performance are statistically significant at the 10% level, and the coefficients on more recent performance are significantly larger than on performance further in the past.
The next three regressions explore how the forced turnover-performance relationship changes with tenure. We again split the sample into three tenure periods -tenure years 3-6, 7-10, and 11-18 -and estimate turnover regressions separately in each sample. Each regression includes all performance lags that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
The results confirm that, for CEOs of all tenure lengths, forced turnover is a function of recent performance but not of performance in the more distant past. For example, in tenure years 11-18, only returns in the current and the previous three years are statistically significant.
When the fourth lag is included, the coefficient on performance in year -4 is -0.03, with a tstatistic of -0.6 (untabulated). Hence, the learning model with constant CEO ability, according
to which all performance lags should affect CEO turnover equally, seems to be an equally bad match for forced turnovers as for performance-induced turnover.
A notable difference between forced CEO turnovers and performance-induced turnovers is that forced turnovers peak early in CEO tenure and decline rapidly as tenure increases. In Table   6 , the probability of a forced turnover is 4.2% per year in tenure years 3-6, 3.4% in years 7-10, and 2.1% in years 11-18. To examine this decline in more detail, Fig. 3 shows forced turnover probabilities for eight tenure year periods (years 1, 2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-11, 12-16, and 17 and higher) . The forced turnover probability is 2.2% in the first tenure year, peaks at 4.9% in tenure
year 2, and declines monotonically thereafter to 1.1% in tenure years 17 and higher. 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-11, 12-16 , and 17 and higher. Turnovers are classified as forced using the Parrino (1997) algorithm.
A comparison of Figures 2 and 3 shows that the estimated probabilities of forced and performance-induced turnover are of the same magnitude in tenure year 2 but diverge rapidly as tenure increases. In tenure years 17 and higher, the performance-induced turnover probability is 3.8% per year while the forced turnover probability is only 1.1%. This large difference is likely explained by the fact that most departures of long-tenured CEOs are preannounced retirements, which the Parrino algorithm classifies as voluntary turnovers.
However, our analysis reveals that a substantial fraction of these departures are in fact performance induced, which means that many more occur at low than at high levels of performance.
Finally, one can apply the distinction between performance-induced and other turnover to forced turnovers as well. As before, one uses the turnover rate at a high benchmark level of performance as estimate of the rate of turnover that is not caused by bad performance. Any additional turnovers at lower levels of performance are assumed to be due to bad performance and labelled as performance induced. Using the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution as the level at which forced turnovers are assumed to be unrelated to performance, Panel B of This high percentage is a direct consequence of the fact that there are few forced turnovers at high levels of performance, which suggests that most forced turnovers would not have occurred had performance been (much) better. However, the results in Tables 4 to 6 also show that, even though most forced turnovers are performance induced, there are many more performanceinduced turnovers that the Parrino algorithm classifies as voluntary.
Changes in performance-induced turnover over time
This section examines how performance-induced turnover changes during our sample period from 1993 to 2011. We split the sample into three subperiods from 1993-1999, 2000-2005, and 2006-2011. The results suggest that the level of performance-induced turnover increases from 1993-99 to 2000-05 and then declines again in 2006-11. The estimated rates of performance-induced turnover are 4.06%, 5.20%, and 4.02% in the three periods, respectively. In parallel, the total turnover rate increases from 11.7% in 1993-99 to 13.3% in 2000-05, which is consistent with Kaplan and Minton's (2012) conclusion that CEO turnover has been rising since the 1970s.
However, the turnover rate falls back to 12.00% in 2006-11, which suggests that the upward trend in CEO turnover has come to a halt toward the end of our sample. Notably, the coefficients on firm performance in the turnover regressions are considerably smaller in 2006-11 compared to the previous two periods, which suggests that boards reacted less strongly to stock price movements during the recent financial crisis.
Discussion
Other determinants of CEO turnover
We have contrasted the empirical properties of performance-induced turnover with predictions from the Bayesian learning models of CEO turnover described in Section 1.
However, these highly stylized models at best capture some of the factors determining CEO turnover in reality. This section offers a brief discussion of other likely determinants of CEO turnover.
Learning-by-doing
Theories of learning-by-doing posit that CEOs build up firm-specific human capital through their on-the-job experience. As tenure increases, incumbent CEOs' expected ability improves, on average, relative to that of potential replacements. The main empirical implication is that performance-induced turnovers should decline with tenure (Garen (1988) ).
The empirical result that performance-induced turnover rises, if slightly, until tenure years 7-8 does not disprove the importance of learning-by-doing. However, it suggests that other factors, such as learning about CEO ability or high turnover costs, dominate in the first tenure years.
Increasing entrenchment
Theories of increasing entrenchment predict that the cost of dismissing CEOs increases with tenure. This might, for example, be because the CEO is gradually appointing his supporters to the board of directors (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) ). The main empirical prediction is again that performance-induced turnovers should decline with tenure.
As before, the empirical result that performance-induced turnover rises slightly until tenure years 7-8 does not disprove the importance of increasing entrenchment. However, it suggests that other factors dominate in the first tenure years.
Heterogeneity and selection
The Bayesian learning models in Section 1 assume that CEOs are heterogeneous in their ability and predict that, as tenure increases, the surviving CEOs are selected for higher ability.
However, there are other dimensions of heterogeneity that these models ignore. For example, CEOs might differ in their level of entrenchment, or firms might differ in their ability to evaluate their CEO. As tenure increases and CEOs are being replaced, the remaining pool of surviving CEOs would then be increasingly selected for being entrenched, for working for firms which are unable to evaluate CEOs, and for other factors associated with less turnover.
The main empirical prediction is again that performance-induced and other turnover should decline with tenure. As before, the result that performance-induced turnover rises slightly until tenure years 7-8 doe not disprove the importance of heterogeneity and selection, but does suggest that other factors dominate at first.
Underestimating performance-induced turnover
There are several reasons to believe that our estimates of performance-induced turnover underestimate the true number. First, the actual performance measures used by boards to evaluate CEOs are unknown, and boards have access to performance signals that are unobservable to us. 19 Using the wrong performance measure implies that we underestimate the effect of (correctly measured) performance on CEO turnover. Specifically, it causes us to overestimate the number of turnovers at high levels of performance, and hence the number of turnovers unrelated to performance, and to underestimate the number of turnovers at low levels of performance, and hence the number of performance-induced turnovers.
Second, stock returns are a problematic measure of firm performance in CEO turnover regressions because stock prices are forward looking. Besides other information, stock prices incorporate investors' assessment of the probability of a CEO turnover. If investors deem a turnover likely, then stock prices and returns reflect in part the expected value of the firm not under the incumbent but under a successor CEO. This reduces the predictive power of stock prices for CEO turnover and biases the estimates of performance-induced turnover downward. 20
Third, estimating performance-induced turnover requires choosing a performance threshold above which all turnovers are assumed to be independent of performance. To the extent that this assumption is violated, we overestimate the number of turnovers unrelated to performance and, as a result, underestimate how many turnovers are caused by bad performance. This occurs if there are turnovers caused by bad performance above the performance threshold, i.e., turnovers that would not have occurred had performance been even
better. An example are CEOs who retire at, say, the 95% percentile of the performance distribution but would have stayed had performance been at the 99% percentile. This also occurs if there are turnovers above the threshold that are caused by good performance, i.e., that would not have happened had performance been lower. An example are successful CEOs who are hired away by other firms. Both violations cause us to overestimate the number of "other" turnovers, and hence to underestimate the number of turnovers that are due to bad performance.
It is difficult to assess by how much we underestimate the frequency of performanceinduced turnovers. However, our estimates already indicate that close to 40% of all turnovers are performance-induced, and that almost 50% of turnovers in the first eight tenure years are in this category. This suggests that many, or possible even most, CEOs leave their position because of a performance-induced turnover.
Conclusion
This paper introduces the concept of performance-induced turnover, which is defined as turnover that would not have occurred had performance been "good". The probability of performance-induced turnover at a given performance level is estimated from the difference between the turnover probability at that level and the turnover probability at some high performance threshold, such as the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution. The assumption is that turnovers at and above this performance threshold are unrelated to performance and, thus, occur at any level of performance. Any higher turnover probability at performance levels below the threshold is assumed to be caused by performance being worse.
These additional turnovers are labelled as performance induced.
We find that CEO turnover is closely linked to firm performance and that performanceinduced turnovers are significantly more frequent than the forced turnovers that are the focus of prior studies. We estimate that almost 40% of all CEO turnovers are performance induced.
In the first eight years of tenure, this percentage is close to 50%.
We contrast the empirical properties of performance-induced turnovers with the predictions of standard Bayesian learning models of CEO turnover. The evidence suggests a version of the Bayesian learning model in which CEO ability or, more likely, match quality is changing over time. Specifically, performance-induced turnover is driven by performance in the most recent three to four years, and is insensitive to performance further in the past.
Moreover, the sensitivity of turnover to past performance shows little to no decline with tenure for at least the first ten years of tenure. Both observations, as well as the slow increase of performance-induced turnover with tenure and its late peak in tenure years 7-8, are consistent with a model in which boards' learning about CEOs is hampered by shocks to CEO ability or to the quality of the CEO-firm match. 
Every period, the board updates its beliefs about ability based on firm performance xt:
The random shocks to ability occur in the beginning of each period t, before the board observes the signal xt. The board then forms its posterior belief � and fires the CEO if the posterior mean falls below the endogenous threshold .
In this model, the prior belief in period t+1 does not equal the posterior belief in t because the board expects ability to change in the beginning of t+1. These shocks to ability increase the variance of the board's prior beliefs in t+1 to 2 + 1 , compared to only 2 in the model much a lagged signal is downgraded depends on how much uncertainty the shocks add to the board's beliefs, as measured by the terms kt,i ≤ 1. To see the intuition, consider the board's posterior beliefs in period t=2, given in (A3.2). The board discounts the once-lagged signal x1 by 2,1 = σ 1 2 σ 1 2 + 1 relative to the current signal x2. Thus, if the second-period shock to ability doubles the variance of the board's beliefs compared to before the shock, then 2,1 = 1 2 and x1 gets half the weight of x2. It is straightforward to see that 2,1 = 1 in the special case with constant ability described in Section 1.1 � 1 = 0�, and that 2,1 = 0 if the shocks to ability are so large that x1 becomes completely uninformative about ability in t=2 � 1 = ∞�.
The board's uncertainty about ability can increase or decrease with tenure. The variance of the board's posterior beliefs in year t is:
Whether 2 is higher or lower than −1 2 depends on the strength of the signals relative to the magnitude of the shocks. Empirically, once can infer whether the board's uncertainty declines or increases with tenure from how the weight on the most recent performance signal changes with tenure: From (A3), a board whose prior tightens assigns decreasing weight to the most recent performance signal as tenure increases.
Appendix B: The Parrino classification algorithm
The Parrino (1997) algorithm classifies CEO departures as forced or voluntary based on information in departure announcements and press reports. The algorithm consists of three steps. First, all cases in which the press reports that a CEO is forced out, fired, ousted, or leaves due to policy differences or pressure are classified as forced. Second, all cases not classified as forced and with a CEO under the age of 60 are reviewed and reclassified as forced if (1) the stated departure reason is not death, poor health, or acceptance of another position, or (2) the CEO is retiring but does not announce the retirement at least six months before the departure.
Third, all cases classified as forced in the previous step are investigated again and reclassified as voluntary if the press convincingly explains that the CEO is leaving for personal or business reasons unrelated to the firm's activities, or if the CEO remains or becomes chairman of the board after the resignation. Table 1 : Estimating performance-induced turnover: numerical example. The simulation is based on 500 randomly generated samples of 23,000 CEO-years, and the table shows descriptive statistics for the estimates across the 500 samples. In the simulations, the CEO is dismissed each year with probability = ( 1 + 2 • � ), the CEO retires each year with probability = ( 1 ), or both events occur simultaneously. Total turnover is governed by eq. (12) in the paper. Parameters α 1 , β 1 , and β 2 are set to -1.4, -1.6, and -0.4, respectively; � is normally distributed with a mean of 0.1 and a standard deviation of 0.3. The performance term is scaled by its standard deviation. The performance-induced turnover probabilities are estimated using either the two-probit model (eq. (11)) or the standard probit model with decile dummies (eq. (10)). Performance-induced turnover, defined in eq. (9), is calculated for each observation with X � equal to the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution. In each simulation, probabilities are averaged across observations within each performance decile. The bottom panel of the table shows descriptive statistics for the estimated coefficients of the two-probit models across the 500 simulations. [-3,0] , and from tenure start to year 0 in regressions 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, where year 0 is the year of the CEO turnover. Panel B shows the implied turnover probabilities. The probabilities are calculated by setting the measure of firm performance to the desired level while leaving all control variables at their actual values and averaging the implied probabilities across observations. The probability of "other turnover" is calculated by setting the performance measure to the top decile of the performance distribution for each observation. The probability of "performance-induced turnover" is calculated from the difference between the implied total turnover probability and the implied probability of "other" turnover for each observation (see equation (9)). [-3,0] in regressions 1 and 2 and using separate return terms for different tenure years in regressions 3 and 4, respectively.
Year 0 is the year of the CEO turnover. Panel B shows the implied turnover probabilities. The probabilities are calculated by setting the measure of firm performance to the desired level while leaving all control variables at their actual values and averaging the implied probabilities across observations. The probability of "other turnover" is calculated by setting the performance measure to the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution for each observation. The probability of "performance-induced turnover" is calculated from the difference between the implied total turnover probability and the implied probability of "other" turnover for each observation (see equation (9)). Table 5 : Performance-induced turnover by tenure. Panel A shows estimates of two-probit regressions of an indicator variable for CEO turnover on firm performance and controls. Performance is measured as average monthly stock returns per tenure year scaled by the standard deviation of returns. Year 0 is the year of the CEO turnover. Panel B shows the implied turnover probabilities. The probabilities are calculated by setting the measure of firm performance to the desired level while leaving all control variables at their actual values and averaging the implied probabilities across observations. The probability of "other turnover" is calculated by setting the performance measure to the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution for each observation and averaging. The probability of "performance-induced turnover" is calculated from the difference between the implied total turnover probability and the implied probability of "other" turnover for each observation (see equation (9)). Table 6 : Forced turnover using standard probit models. Panel A shows probit regressions of an indicator variable for forced CEO turnover on firm performance. Performance is measured as average monthly stock returns scaled by the standard deviation of returns. Panel B shows the implied turnover probabilities. The probabilities are calculated by setting the measure of firm performance to the desired level while leaving all control variables at their actual values and averaging the implied probabilities across observations. The probability of "other turnover" is calculated by setting the performance measure to the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution for each observation. The probability of "performance-induced turnover" is calculated from the difference between the implied total forced turnover probability and the implied probability of "other" forced turnover for each observation (see equation (9)). Table 7 : Performance-induced turnover in different calendar time periods. Panel A shows estimates of two-probit regressions of an indicator variable for CEO turnover on firm performance and controls. Performance is measured as average monthly stock returns per tenure year scaled by the standard deviation of returns. Year 0 is the year of the CEO turnover. Panel B shows the implied turnover probabilities. The probabilities are calculated by setting the measure of firm performance to the desired level while leaving all control variables at their actual values and averaging the implied probabilities across observations. The probability of "other turnover" is calculated by setting the performance measure to the 95 th percentile of the performance distribution for each observation. The probability of "performance-induced turnover" is calculated from the difference between the implied total turnover probability and the implied probability of "other" turnover for each observation (see equation (9)). Probit 1:
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